Appendix i.
With an additional Security Council seat, would Europe not be over represented?
Ongoing conflicts such as those in Kashmir, Somalia, Darfur, Syria, Russia-Ukraine, and the Rohingya crisis highlight challenges the UN confronts in resolving complex disputes and addressing humanitarian emergencies. This step aims to reflect the contemporary geopolitical landscape more accurately and ensure broader representation in key decision-making processes.
Immediate structural reforms are necessary within the UN system, such as expanding the Security Council's membership to include emerging global powers like India, Brazil, and Germany. Supporting such initiatives like the G4 which aims to reflect the contemporary geopolitical landscape more accurately and ensure broader representation in key decision-making processes.
Article 23 of the United Nations Charter prioritizes a country's contributions to the UN's mission as the main factor for Security Council membership, with considerations of fair geographic representation being secondary in importance.
Europe, especially the EU member states, stands as a robust cornerstone within the United Nations. EU member states finance over a third of the UN budget and contribute more than half of the funding for global development cooperation efforts.
The G4 reform proposal wouldn't elevate the EU members' proportional representation of seats. Currently, two to four EU members may hold Security Council seats concurrently – France and the UK as permanent members, and one to three non-permanent members representing Western European and Others Group and/or Eastern European Group. Post-reform, the EU might hold six or seven of the projected 25 or 26 seats, signaling a slight proportional reduction to under a third of the Security Council's seats instead of an increase.
How might this impact global efforts towards conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and human rights protection?
Proposing amendments to relevant international agreements or creating new protocols within international organizations like the United Nations. In this case member states can advocate for and adopt rules that necessitate a supermajority vote for crucial decisions concerning humanitarian crises or global security threats. The US veto in Israel’s genocide on Palestinians and the Council’s inability to pass a resolution for a Gaza ceasefire reveal the Council’s paralysis, undermined by geopolitical divisions. The recurring use of the veto to defend US and Israeli interests, amidst daily horrific human rights violations, exposes the urgent need for reform to prioritise humanitarian concerns over political considerations.
Requiring a supermajority of votes to veto resolutions would make it more difficult for individual nations to block actions aimed at resolving conflicts. This could encourage greater accountability among Security Council members to engage in constructive dialogue and seek consensus-based solutions.With a higher threshold for veto power, the UNSC may be more inclined to approve and support robust peacekeeping missions in conflict-affected regions, bolstering international efforts to maintain peace and security.
A supermajority system can incentivize diplomatic efforts and negotiations among Security Council members to reach agreements that consider diverse perspectives and interests. This could lead to more sustainable and inclusive conflict resolution frameworks. A supermajority requirement discourages unilateral actions by any single member state that may hinder collective decision-making and undermine multilateral diplomacy.
Can Security Council reform be prevented by a veto?
The process of reforming the Security Council necessitates an amendment to the United Nations Charter. Article 108 outlines the relevant procedure, which unfolds in a two-stage process:
During the initial stage, the General Assembly, with each of the 193 member states holding one vote, must endorse the reform with a two-thirds majority (equivalent to at least 128 states), thereby amending the United Nations Charter as an international treaty.
During the second stage, the revised Charter must be ratified by at least two-thirds of the member states, which also includes the five permanent Council members, following their respective national procedures. When the Security Council underwent its initial and thus far singular enlargement in 1963, this process spanned approximately one and a half years.
In the initial stage, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) do not necessarily need to reach a consensus. However, during the subsequent stage, the parliaments of these P5 nations could hinder the adoption of the amended Charter by failing to ratify it. Even if permanent members vote against a proposed amendment in the General Assembly, this doesn't automatically prevent them from ratifying the amended Charter later on. For instance, during the 1963 vote to expand the Security Council, only one permanent member voted in favor. However, by 1965—just eighteen months later—all five permanent members had ratified the amended Charter after all.
Why should member states boost the PBC to intervene?
On the effectiveness of ECOWAS: ECOWAS played a pivotal role in mediating and resolving civil wars in Liberia (1999-2003) and Sierra Leone (1991-2002). ECOWAS deployed peacekeeping forces, facilitated peace talks, and supported disarmament and demobilization efforts, contributing to the end of hostilities and the transition to peace.
The AU, in collaboration with regional partners and the UN, established AMISOM in 2007 to support the Somali government's efforts against insurgent groups like Al-Shabaab. AMISOM's presence has helped stabilize key areas, facilitate political processes, and build Somali security forces' capacities.
Enhance the PeaceBuilding Commission's capacity to intervene effectively in conflict-prone areas by reviewing and strengthening national prevention strategies of member states. Empower the PBC to serve as a platform for developing and deliberating on national prevention plans, expanding its scope to encompass non-military threats, climate-related risks, socioeconomic disparities, and technological challenges. Grant the PBC greater investigative and decision-making authority akin to that of bodies like the Human Rights Council, possibly including mechanisms like special rapporteurs.
The PeaceBuilding Commission (PBC) currently lacks enforcement mechanisms, and its recommendations hold no binding authority, relying instead on member states’ and partners’ voluntary acceptance. Without investigative or accountability powers, it lacks effective means of implementation. Its consensus-based decision-making process can be obstructed by even one member, leading to limitations in addressing issues related to countries where PBC members have vested interests. This can also result in affected nations refusing support from the PBC. Such challenges can mimic the geopolitical stalemates seen in other international bodies. Moreover, crucial yet contentious topics such as climate, peace, and security often receive insufficient attention in PBC discussions.
Reducing the use of veto power in cases of mass atrocities or humanitarian emergencies a necessity?
Enabling the UN Security Council (UNSC) to take decisive action during crises while upholding fairness and inclusivity is crucial. Measures such as the ‘Code of Conduct’ can strengthen the Council’s ability to hold accountable states responsible for severe human rights violations, reducing the use of vetoes to shield perpetrators from justice. Implementing a supermajority veto system can make it harder to block resolutions aimed at preventing atrocities and protecting vulnerable populations through peacekeeping mandates or targeted sanctions, thus enhancing global human rights protection.
China and Russia, as UNSC members with veto power, have frequently vetoed resolutions concerning humanitarian aid delivery in conflict zones like Syria. These actions hinder essential assistance to civilians, especially in areas under Syrian government control. Efforts to hold perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations in Syria accountable through international mechanisms like the International Criminal Court (ICC) have faced obstacles due to these vetoed resolutions, impeding justice for victims and survivors.
Similar challenges arose in Myanmar, where veto usage by China and Russia hindered robust international action, affecting regional stability and efforts to address displacement, intercommunal tensions, and human rights abuses. In Ukraine, Russia’s vetoed resolutions condemning its annexation of Crimea impede efforts to uphold sovereignty and territorial integrity, impacting the legitimacy of its actions.
The use of vetoes in these cases undermines collective international denunciations of actions violating established norms, impacting the perceived legitimacy of such actions. Proponents must establish criteria for determining when “mass atrocities” warrant action, addressing disagreements among UNSC’s permanent members. They must also clarify that invoking “vital national interest” as a veto loophole should not hinder decisive action in cases like Syria, where inaction perpetuates atrocities.
What specific diplomatic approaches and strategies can be employed to reinvigorate global disarmament negotiations, considering the complex interests and concerns of nuclear-armed states?
Engage in diplomatic initiatives and strengthen international cooperation to rejuvenate disarmament negotiations, improve verification mechanisms, and foster diplomatic dialogues among nuclear-armed states to ease tensions and honor global security commitments. Participate actively in multilateral platforms such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences to reinvigorate disarmament talks.
Monitoring the New START Agreement: This approach effectively oversees the details of a potential new agreement between the US and Russia regarding nuclear weapons, ensuring compliance with warhead deployment limits, especially focusing on smaller warheads not actively used in combat. This strategy is more comprehensive than simply counting warheads as it considers specific strategic objectives and locations.
China's Strategy: China advocates starting with simpler tasks before tackling more complex issues in disarmament negotiations. Verifying the absence of warheads is relatively straightforward as it does not involve sensitive components. The technology for this verification already exists and has been successfully used by Russia and the US, making it accessible to other nations without extensive technological requirements.
Non-Disclosure of Details: The absence verification method does not delve into precise details about nuclear arsenals or their functionalities. This approach may appeal to countries wishing to maintain some confidentiality during early disarmament discussions. It can also encourage the participation of nations new to nuclear control agreements, fostering a more comfortable environment for cooperation.